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THE PENNSYLVANIA UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
BOARD OF REVIEW: ITS FUNCTIONS
AND RESPONSIBILITIES
By MAURICE ABRAMS *
T HE current economic recession has focused considerable attention upon the
national unemployment situation. The present Congress of the United
States seeks to implement the various state unemployment compensation pro-
grams so as to provide for extended benefits. In the industrialized Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania, unemployment has reached an unprecedented high
level. The Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Law,' recognizes that
"economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health,
morals and welfare of the people of the Commonwealth." The program
briefly contemplates applications for unemployment compensation benefits by
unemployed workers, separated from their employment through no fault of
their own. These applications are initially filed with the Bureau of Employ-
ment Security, which department is charged with the responsibility for de-
termining the validity of such applications. After the determinations have
been made by the Bureau, the Act provides for necessary appellate procedures.
The Unemployment Compensation Board of Review was established by
the Legislature to administer a complete appeals program at two levels, in-
cluding the supervision, direction and control of referee activities with regard
to the conduct of hearings and issuance of decisions on original appeals from
Bureau determinations; and further review by the Board Members of case
records and issuance of decisions on appeal from referee decisions.
The Board consists of three members, one of whom serves as chairman.
They are nominated and appointed by the Governor, and upon confirmation
by two-thirds of the Senate, serve a term of six years. The Board, pursuant
to its authority, prescribes Rules of Procedure governing appeals activity at
both the referee and Board levels.
The right of appeal is available to the claimant, last employer or base year
employer of a claimant, as well as to the Bureau of Employment Security. The
law specifically provides that decisions rendered either by the Bureau of Em-
ployment Security or -the Unemployment Compensation referees shall become
* Chairman, Unemployment Compensation Board of Review; B.S., LL.B., Temple University;
Member of the bar Philadelphia County; Member Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n.
'PA. STAT. ANN. tit 43 §751 et seq. (1936).
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final unless further appealed within ten days after such decisions have been
issued. The provisions of the law, which prescribe the ten-day period for
taking appeals, have -been construed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court to be
mandatory and consequently cannot be extended.' Thus, an appeal that has
not been filed within the prescribed time limit must be dismissed by the ap-
peals tribunal for lack of jurisdiction.
In order to facilitate the appellate functions, the Act further provides for
the appointment of referees who serve under the jurisdiction and control of
the Board of Review. The referees are in effect representatives or agents of
the Board of Review, which is the ultimate fact-finding body.' The Board of
Review has the power to assume original jurisdiction of claims and to hold
hearings without prior hearings conducted before referees. By reason of the
voluminous number of cases reaching the various appellate levels, it is un-
realistic for the Board of Review to conduct hearings. For example, during
the year 1957, twenty-two thousand eight hundred fifteen appeals were filed
at both Referee and Board levels, and the Board and its referees issued seven-
teen thousand five hundred ninety-six decisions, which covered twenty-two
thousand five hundred fifty-six appeals. In connection with this large volume
of appeals, twenty thousand seven hundred seventy-three hearings were sched-
uled and eighty-eight thousand nine hundred eighty pages of testimony were
recorded. Generally, the testimony is not transcribed unless a further appeal
is filed from the referee's decision, which reduced the -transcription work to
twenty-three thousand five hundred seventy pages of testimony.
The referees are charged with the responsibility of hearing and deter-
mining all original appeals filed from Bureau decisions. The efficiency of the
referee system is attested by the fact that in approximately seventy per cent
of such appealed cases, the party litigants took no further appellate action, ac-
cepting the referee's determination as final and conclusive. At the present
time there are fourteen referees serving as representatives and agents of the
Board of Review.'
The Board's central office in Harrisburg establishes record controls in each
case and makes an assignment of the case with the proper documents to the
appropriate referee in accordance with established referee districts. Each case
is reviewed in the referee's office for the purpose of establishing the subject
matter and specific issues involved. Hearing itineraries are arranged; notices
of hearing prepared and mailed to the parties, their counsel, and representa-
2 Von Kaenel v. Unemployment Compensation Board, 163 Pa. Super. 173, 60 A.2d 586 (1948).
3 Franke Unemployment Compensation Case, 166 Pa. Super. 251, 70 A.2d 461 (1949).
4 There were sixteen referees, but during the year 1957 one died and another resigned.
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tives. The hearings must be so calendared that parties and witnesses are not
required to wait an unreasonable length of time for the hearings. Stenographic
record is made of the referee's hearing. Decisions are prepared by the referee
promptly following the close of the hearing. All such decisions are reviewed
by the Board, both as to substance and form, prior to release thereof to the
parties in interest.
Litigants are advised of -their right to file a further appeal within the
prescribed statutory time limit of ten days. Where notice of such appeal is
received the stenographic notes of the hearings are transcribed and the com-
plete case file is then transmitted to the Board's central office.
Two types of appeal may be filed with the Board of Review. The first
type covers Bureau determinations that ruled on the benefit rights of the
claimant during specific claim weeks as provided for either under the Penn-
sylvania Unemployment Compensation Law or related Federal programs which
provide for the payment of unemployment compensation benefits to veterans
and Federal employes. The other type of appeal covers situations in which
it was held that the base-year employer's request for relief from charges was
not filed in accordance with the Bureau's regulations; or that the claimant's
separation from base-year employment was not due to discharge for wilful
misconduct in connection with his work, or to voluntarily leaving work with-
out good cause attributable to 'his employment, as defined in the law.'
Under its Rules of Procedure, the Board allows seven days advance notice
of a hearing on the appeal, and this notice is forwarded to the parties, their
counsel or duly authorized representatives. The parties may then appear be-
fore the Board of Review, sitting en banc in Harrisburg, or may request a
decision based on briefs filed with the Board. Each case is considered by
the Board Members convened in executive session for such purpose. Each
decision requires the approval of two members of the Board. Aggrieved
parties have the right to request reconsideration, rehearing, or reargument
within ten days following the date on which the Board's decision was issued.
During the year 1957, the Board received two hundred ninety-seven requests
for reconsideration of its decision, and one hundred twenty-five arguments were
scheduled before the Board, sitting en banc. Following the review of the
record in connection with each such request, the parties are again notified of
the Board's final action. The right of further appeal to the Pennsylvania
Superior Court is provided for by statute. Such appeal must be taken within
thirty days after the date upon which the Board's decision becomes final.
5
PA. STAT. ANN, tit. 43 § 802 (e) (1952).
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Proceedings before the Board of Review and its referees are of a quasi-
judicial nature. The hearings 'before referees are conducted with due regard
to judicial decorum. Determinations by referees are predicated upon Board
precedents and Superior Court decisions. The referees are not bound by strict
rules of evidence. The findings of fact, however, must be based upon evidence
that is legally competent. Findings of fact supported by substantial competent
evidence are binding on the court.6 The Pennsylvania Superior Court, which
is the immediate appellate tribunal, will not disturb the Board's findings of
fact if such findings are supported by competent evidence and testimony.
The Board's over-all responsibilities for administrative control and di-
reaction of the entire appeals program, and personal review of the voluminous
records pertaining to an annual workload in excess of five thousand appeal
proceedings, had necessitated restrictive procedures in the handling and dis-
position of this large number of appeals. The Board 'has adopted the pro-
cedure of remanding appeal cases to referees for the purpose of adducing ad-
ditional testimony as required in each particular instance. During the year
1957, eighteen hundred eighty-eight remand orders were issued at the request
of appellant and/or appellee, which amounted to fifty-eight percent of the
individual appeals filed with the Board. Eighty-two percent of the further
hearings were requested by the claimant. In these so-called "remand cases"
where the appellant requests an opportunity to present such additional testi-
mony, the referee, to whom the case has been remanded, informs the parties
that he is conducting the remand hearing as Hearing Officer for the Board;
and that upon receipt of the additional testimony the entire file, including the
complete transcript, will be returned to the members of the Board for their re-
view and determination. The efficient operation of this program has amply
demonstrated that this plan for administering appeals is an expeditious one.
The Board is ever vigilant to make certain that referees dispose of their
cases promptly. The purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Law is
tO make benefits available as promptly as possible to claimants who are prop-
erly entitled to receive such benefits. The basic reason for Unemployment
Compensation is to alleviate economic distress. Appeal procedures, therefore,
must be so geared as to eliminate unwarranted delays in benefit determinations.
During the year 1957 the referees issued fourteen thousand five hundred thirty-
eight decisions. Appeals from referee decisions to the Board resulted in the
issuance of three thousand fifty-eight Board decisions.
6 Stratton Unemployment Compensation Case, 179 Pa. Super. 597, 117 A.2d 807 (1955);
Barr Unemployment Compensation Case, 172 Pa. Super. 389, 93 A.2d 877 (1953).
7 Carpenter Unemployment Compensation Case, 178 Pa. Super. 639, 115 A.2d 901 (1955).
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A concentrated effort has been made to reduce to a minimum the time
required in processing appeals at each step of the appeal proceeding. Cur-
rently, the referees are issuing eighty-three percent of their decisions within
forty-five days after the appeal has been filed; the Board has been issuing
sixty percent of its decisions within forty-five days after the appeal was filed.
Latest available figures indicate that the nationwide average with regard to
the issuance of decisions at the referee level was seventy-six percent within
forty-five days, and fifty-six per cent at the Board level.
In addition to the normal appeals workload within the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, there is a national arrangement whereby Boards or referees
are required to hold hearings for tribunals of other States; i.e., to take testi-
mony of individuals who filed claims against another State but subsequently
resided temporarily or permanently in Pennsylvania. In all such proceedings
the appeals tribunal in, Pennsylvania acts only as the agent for the liable State.
Generally, in such proceedings, the testimony is recorded mechanically and
forwarded to the particular State against which the appeal was filed. During
the year the referees conducted hearings and recorded testimony in thirteen
hundred eleven proceedings at the request of appeals tribunals of other States.
During the year a total of one hundred two Board decisions were ap-
pealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Forty-seven opinions were re-
leased by the Superior Court In only two cases was the Board's decision re-
versed. A resum6 of the selected important decisions made by the court since
January of 1957 to date follows:
Crucible Steel Co. of America v. U. C. Board of Review ' (Earl King)
Claimant, a coal miner, and another miner, were assigned to work as
cutters in the mine. They refused to cut the coal because there was no "crib"
supporting the roof. The mine foreman, together with the mine safety super-
visor, visited the place, found it safe and so advised the men. The employes
persisted in the stand taken and were discharged. By mid-afternoon the other
coal miners walked off their jobs. The following day, at the request of the
union, the state Mine Inspector visited the mine and found it in perfect con-
dition.
The Federal Coal Mine Safety Act ' contains provisions similar to those
of our State Act, including the inspection of coal mines by designated of-
ficials to obtain information relating to health and safety conditions in the
8 183 Pa. Super. 629, 63 A.2d 492 (1957).




mines. The contract between the union and employer bound them to comply
with both the Federal law and the mining law of this State. The union,
instead of ordering a work stoppage, could have compelled compliance with
the safety or other provisions of its contract if any of the provisions had been
violated. The particular employes involved had a legal remedy for such
damages as they might have sustained due to discharge in violation of the
collective bargaining agreement.
This case was disposed of by the application of the rule stated in Miller
v. Unemp. Comp. Bd."°
"The Unemployment Compensation Law was not intended to promote
stoppages of work by employees because of disputes with employers . . . which
could be legally determined without any cessation of work . . . To call a sus-
pension of work and act in concert to prevent a continuance of operations,
without resorting to legal measures open to determine the rights of the parties,
amounts to a voluntary suspension of work, with the necessary consequences
provided by the Act."
Unemployment Compensation benefits were denied.
American Bag and Paper Company v. U. C. Board of Review " (Alice Dati)
This claimant stopped her machine in defiance of instructions from her
superior. In the argument that followed, the claimant used abusive language
to her superior and told her she could stop her machine whenever it was
necessary.
The court ruled that the disobedience of the order to start up her machine
was a deliberate disregard of her employer's interests.
The indecent abuse of her superior because of a disagreement by the
claimant employe on a matter of judgment with her floorlady, was held to be
a substantial disregard of the employer's interest and of the employe's duties.
Unemployment compensation benefits were denied.
Merck & Company v. U. C. Board of Review' 2 (Mary Nygren)
Claimant after receiving compensation for ten weeks, was offered a posi-
tion as a clerk at sixty cents an hour. Claimant refused the offer based on
the low wage rate.
10 152 Pa. Super. 315, 31 A.2d 740 (1943).
11 184 Pa. Super. 292, 132 A.2d 765 (1957).
12 184 Pa. Super. 138, 132 A.2d 727 (1957).
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Claimant's last employment as a packer on daylight shift was $1.44 an
hour, and $1.49 an hour for night shift. Prior to this, claimant was employed
for seven and one half years at $1.25 an hour, and for two and one-half years
at $1.33 an hour. Claimant's weekly benefit rate was $33.00 a week.
The court noted that the poffered employment was at a wage approx-
imately 40% of that which the claimant had received for a number of years;
it was at a gross salary substantially less than the amount of compensation
she had been receiving; it was at an hourly rate which was exceedingly low.
The court ruled that although any one of the three aforementioned con-
ditions would not have justified the Board's conclusion that the proffered
employment was not suitable work, consideration of the three conditions to-
gether established a basis for not disturbing the Board's decision that the
proffered employment was not suitable work. Unemployment compensation
benefits were allowed.
Kendall Refining Company v. U. C. Board of Review 18 (William McGinnis)
Claimants were members of Local 567, Oil Workers International Union
C.I.O. Their contract was due to expire midnight, February 7, 1954. The
employer and the union began negotiations, and after many conferences the
employes reported for work on February 8, 1954, at which time they were
informed that the plant had been shut down, and that little or no work would
be available.
The court ruled that there was a stoppage of work resulting from the
affirmative action of the employer in closing down its processing units. It
could not be said that there was no basis for the Board's ultimate conclusion
that "the shutdown of the plant was the final step in the -plan of the employer
to strengthen its bargaining position." Therefore, the court ruled that the
final responsibility for the work stoppage rested upon the employer, and was
"the result of a lockout as defined in Section 402(d) of the Law." 14 Un-
employment Compensation benefits allowed.
Carrie Rex v. U. C. Board of Review 15
Claimant, after filing for nine consecutive weeks of benefits, was referred
by the local employment office to work in a garment factory. Claimant re-
ported to the prospective employer and was informed she would be called
1- 184 Pa. Super. 95, 132 A.2d 749 (1957).
141d. at 105, 132 A.2d at 754; Cf. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 802 (d).
15 183 Pa. Super. 442 132 A.2d 363 (1957).
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for work on May 14, 1956. The day before she was. to begin work claimant
called the new employer and informed him that she would work for a lim-
ited time but that as soon as her former employer recalled her, she would
leave the new employment. As a result of this disclosure, claimant was not
hired. Claimant returned to her former employment on June 14, 1956.
The court ruled that claimant, by limiting her willingness to work only
until such time as she may be recalled by her former employer, so restricted
her availability for work as to render herself unavailable and, in effect, de-
tached herself from the labor market. It was stated that the appeal was con-
trolled by the court's decision in Pinto Unemployment Compensation Case,16
wherein it was stated that one may render himself unavailable for work by
conditions and limitations as to employment, and that willingness to work con-
ditionally does not necessarily meet the test of availability. Unemployment
compensation benefits denied.
Eugene Pisani and Nicholas Pisani v. U. C. Board of Review 17
Bureau decisions denying benefits were mailed to claimant brothers on
June 19, 1956, and contained a notice that the last day to file an appeal was
June 29, 1956. A letter of protest dated July' 2, 1956, was mailed by counsel
for claimants to the Bureau and formal appeals were filed July 11, 1956.
The court stated that the Bureau of Employment Security is clothed with
the authority to make decisions upon available information furnished by the
parties according to the orderly procedural rules of the Bureau. The absence
of any hearings at this stage of the proceedings is immaterial, so long as the
right of appeal or review of such administrative action by a judicial tribunal
is afforded. The Act does provide 18 such an administrative procedure and
therefore, the parties were accorded "procedural due process of law."
The court ruled that under the provisions of this section of the law, the
parties must take advantage of their right to review within the time fixed by
the statute.
William WValley v. U. C. Board of Review 19
A practicing chiropodist was found not to be "unemployed" after he lost
his regular employment when it was shown that he held himself out as a
chiropodist, made house calls, was listed in the telephone directory as a chirop-
odist and generally practiced his profession.
16 168 Pa. Super. 540, 79 A.2d 802 (1951).
17 184 Pa. Super. 35, 132 A.2d 760 (1957).
1
8 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 §821 (a) (1952).
1 184 Pa. Super. 456, 136 A.2d 136 (1957).
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The court ruled that one who practices a profession takes himself out of
the category of an "unemployed employee" thus rendering himself ineligible
for benefits under the Act.
James P. Fennessy v. U. C. Board of Review 20
Where a claimant was advised by his personal physician to discontinue
his regular work because it was causing "cardiac stress" the court ruled that
it was incumbent on the claimant to contact his employer and explain the rea-
son for his failure to continue in his regular job and to inquire into the pos-
sibilities of being placed in a job which would not aggravate his physical
condition.
It was further held that claimant's failure to attempt to keep the employer-
employe relationship alive rendered his action a voluntary quit without cause
of a necessitous and compelling nature and thus disqualified him for benefits.
Seley Farms v. U. C. Board of Review 21 (Elmer Wolfe)
A claimant who was employed on a farm which was principally used
as a game and hunting preserve, was held by the court to be in employment
excluded from coverage under the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation
Law. It was shown that his duties consisted of feeding and watering the
pheasants, taking care of the eggs and hatching, feeding and caring for the
dogs, and releasing and spotting the 'birds, as needed, for hunting. The court
held that the claimant's duties were clearly of an "agricultural nature" and
therefore were excluded from coverage under the provisions of the Unem-
ployment Compensation Law.
Stella Cicerella v. U. C. Board of Review 22
A secretary for an insurance company who had been employed for thirty-
one years and whose final salary was $333 a month, was laid off by her em-
ployer when they moved their operation out of State. After approximately
three months of unemployment, the employment service referred her to a
secretarial position paying $250 a month, which the claimant refused on the
grounds that the salary offered was "too low."
The court in denying the claimant compensation held that while there
was a substantial reduction in salary the job itself was one the claimant was
20 184 Pa. Super. 492, 135 A.2d 814 (1957).
21 185 Pa. Super. 413, 138 A.2d 174 (1958).
22 185 Pa. Super. 63, 137 A.2d 853 (1958).
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capable of performing and paid the prevailing rate for secretarial work in
the area where she resided.
The court stated that despite the fact the salary offered was lower than
that received in her previous employment, the claimant had been unemployed
for approximately three months and she could not be permitted an indefinite
time to decline work on that ground but was entitled only to a reasonable
opportunity to obtain work at the same salary.
Pramco, Inc. v. U. C. Board of Review 2 3 (Alma 1. Melchick)
Claimants who resorted to picketing their employer in order to obtain
recognition of a union they were attempting to establish and who failed to
petition the National Labor Relations Board for an election, were held by
the court to be voluntarily unemployed when the employer failed to rehire
them after the picketing ceased. In its opinion the court held that since the
plant continued operating throughout the period of the picketing, the labor
dispute provisions of the Act were not applicable to the case.
The term "stoppage of work" was held to mean "cessation of work in
the plant or place of employment" and not cessation of work by the employe.
The court concluded that the acts of the claimants constituted a volun-
tary leaving under the law 24 and made them ineligible for compensation. The
claimants have previously left their work to picket the plant of their employer,
the reason for the failure to re-employ them at a later date was immaterial.
The Board of Review has a most important role to play in the admin-
istration of the Unemployment Compensation program. In the exercise of its
quasi-judicial function it must observe the fundamental basic requirements for
due process of law on behalf of the party litigants who appear before the
referees and the Board itself. The discharge of the Board's responsibilities
require it to make prompt decisions, so that benefit payments where proper
may not be unduly delayed. The Unemployment Compensation Law has
been characterized as remedial humanitarian legislation, and its benefit sec-
tions must be liberally and broadly construed." Its prime objective is to al-
leviate the rigors of unemployment.2"
28 185 Pa. Super. 303, 138 A.2d 210 (1958).
2 4
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 802 (b) (1952).
25 Bliley Electric Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board, 158 Super. 548, 45 A.2d 898
(1946); MacFarland v. Unemployment Compensation Board, 158 Pa. Super. 418, 45 A.2d 423
(1946).
26 Glen Alden Coal Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board, 160 Pa. Super. 379, 51 A.2d
518 (1947).
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The courts have held that the law represents the exercise of the State's
police power to abolish economic insecurity due to unemployment."1 The
legislative mandate is clear. The fundamental social and economic purpose
of this law is to provide a measure of relief for those persons who are un-
employed through no fault of their own. The Pennsylvania Superior Court's
interpretation of the law confirms the remedial and humanitarian purposes for
which the Unemployment Compensation Law was intended. In the exercise
of its functions, the Board of Review must discharge its responsibilities in
accordance with this well defined purpose.
27 MacFarland v. Unemployment Compensation Board, op. cit. 25.

